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the warrant procedure, see, e. g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), or that in most instances
failure to comply with the warrant requirement can only be excused by exigent circumstances,
see, e. g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); cf. Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364, 367-368 (1964). But we deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct - necessarily
swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat - which
historically has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure. Instead, the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 17
Nonetheless, the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the requirement of
probable cause remain fully relevant in this context. In order to assess the reasonableness of
Officer McFadden's conduct as a general proposition, it is necessary "first to focus upon the
governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally
protected interests of the private citizen," for there is "no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which
the search [or seizure] entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 -535, 536-537
(1967). And in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant that intrusion. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it
is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be
subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness
of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that
assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the
facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search "warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief" that the action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 -97 (1964). Anything less would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. See, e. g., Beck v.
Ohio, supra; Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959). And simple "`good faith on the part of the arresting officer is not enough.' . . . If
subjective good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would
evaporate, and the people would be `secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,' only in
the discretion of the police." Beck v. Ohio, supra, at 97.
Applying these principles to this case, we consider first the nature and extent of the governmental
interests involved. One general interest is of course that of effective crime prevention and
detection; it is this interest which underlies the recognition that a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.
It was this legitimate investigative function Officer McFadden was discharging when he decided
to approach petitioner and his companions. He had observed Terry, Chilton, and Katz go through
a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted
further investigation. There is nothing unusual in two men standing together on a street corner,
perhaps waiting for someone. Nor is there anything suspicious about people in such
circumstances strolling up and down the street, singly or in pairs. Store windows, moreover, are
made to be looked in. But the story in quite different where, as here, two men hover about a street
corner for an extended period of time, at the end of which it becomes apparent that they are not
waiting for anyone or anything; where these men pace alternately along an identical route,
pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route
is followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner; where they are
joined in one of these conferences by a third man who leaves swiftly; and where the two men
finally follow the third and rejoin him a couple of blocks away. It would have been poor police
work indeed for an officer of 30 years' experience in the detection of thievery from stores in this
same neighborhood to have failed to investigate this behavior further.
The crux of this case, however, is not the propriety of Officer McFadden's taking steps to
investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification for